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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN QUAS,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 890601-CA
Priority No. 2

STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant/Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Quas requests rehearing of his case.

See Brown v.

Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining circumstances allowing
rehearing) ; Cummincrs v. Nielsonf 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913) (same) .
A copy of this Court's opinion is in Appendix 1.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD REWRITE THE BRICKEY ISSUE
IN A MANNER THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE BRICKEY DECISION
AND THE RECORD IN THIS CASE.
A. THIS COURT SHOULD OMIT THE DISCUSSION OF "GOOD CAUSE" FOR
REFILING CASES.
Quas is consistent with Brickey in limiting the
circumstances in which a prosecutor may refile a case to two
circumstances:

1) when the prosecutor presents new or previously

unavailable evidence, and 2) when the prosecutor presents other good
cause.

Quas at 3.
The error in the Quas decision lies in the interpretation

of the "good cause" limitation.

In Quas, this court concluded that

if a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the evidence necessary to
sustain a finding of probable cause, the prosecutor has "good cause"
to refile the case after additional investigation.

Under the Quas

"good cause" analysis, a prosecutor could base a successive
preliminary hearing on evidence that was readily available at the
previous preliminary hearing(s) as long as he asserts good faith in
doing so

("the ensuing investigation was not performed to

procrastinate, harass, or shop for a more favorable magistrate").
Quas at 3.

This interpretation of the "good cause" limitation thus

eviscerates the "new or previously unavailable evidence" limitation
and relies on the good faith of the prosecutor in claiming a
mistaken assessment of the evidence necessary to support a finding
of probable cause.
The Brickey court set forth the "new or previously
unavailable evidence" limit for a reason—"[T]he prosecutor's good
faith is a fragile protection for the accused."

State v. Brickey,

714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986).

The Quas "good cause" for refiling standard is adopted from
the standard for establishing "good cause" to continue the
preliminary hearing.

Quas at 3 n.l.

It is true that "Brickey does

not distinguish between a continuance of a preliminary hearing and a
refiling."

Id.

Lack of explicit distinction, however, does not

blur the standards that apply to distinct remedies.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three remedies for a
prosecutor facing a dismissal of an information:
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1) continue the

case and obtain the necessary evidence; 2) appeal the magistrate's
dismissal of the case; or 3) refile the case if there is new or
previously unavailable evidence or other good cause to justify the
refiling.1

These remedies are adequate for the prosecution and must

be interpreted strictly to insure that prosecutors provide
constitutionally adequate preliminary hearings.

See State v.

Anderson. 612 P.2d 778, 783-784 (Utah 1980)(decided under Article I
section 12 of the Utah Constitution; recognizing that preliminary
hearings in Utah facilitate the right to a fair trial by giving
criminal defendants notice and discovery of the Stated case);
State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986)(decided under
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution; recognizing that
preliminary hearings in Utah are designed to protect the accused
from groundless prosecutions, to conserve judicial resources, and to
promote confidence in the system of justice).
If a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of
evidence necessary to sustain a finding of probable cause, the

1. The Brickey court's footnote 5, found at pages 647 and
648 of Brickev states,
In Harper v. District Court. Okla., 484 P.2d
891 (1971), the Oklahoma court clarified Jones,
holding that good cause to continue a preliminary
hearing for further investigation might exist
when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the
quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover
and further investigation clearly would not be
dilatory. 484 P.2d 897. In addition, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has added a new Rule 6 to
the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals,
permitting the state to appeal from an adverse
ruling at a preliminary hearing. See State ex
rel. Fallis v. Caldwell, 498 P.2d 426, 428-429.
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magistrate should allow a reasonable continuance for the collection
of evidence that is reasonably available, and which continuance
would not cause undue delay.

Since the prosecutor has the

continuance remedy, however, it is not appropriate for a prosecutor
to allow a case to be dismissed, and later refile the case, claiming
an innocent miscalculation of the evidence.

Rather, to refile the

case, the prosecutor must present new or previously unavailable
evidence, or other good cause to justify the refiling.

Brickey.

On rehearing, this Court should omit the discussion
blurring "good cause" for refiling and "good cause" for a
continuance.

Under Ouas, a prosecutor has "good cause" to continue

or to refile a case if he innocently miscalculates the evidence.
Quas at 3.

This case does not involve the prosecutor's innocent

miscalculation of the evidence.

Rather, the magistrate's dismissal

of the case after the first preliminary hearing and continuance
resulted from the prosecutor's failure to present the gunshot
residue (GSR) tests, despite the magistrate's repeated requests for
that evidence which was in the prosecutor's possession.
P.H.I 111-121, 167-169; T. 814 at 2-5.

See e.g.

Because this case does not

involve an innocent miscalculation of the evidence or any other good
cause for refiling the information, the "good cause" discussion is
neither pertinent nor necessary to the Ouas opinion.

B. THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY BRICKEY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECORD IN
THIS CASE.
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Quas correctly notes that at the successive preliminary
hearing in this case, "the State presented twelve new exhibits and
five new witnesses," and the magistrate found that the evidence
presented at the successive preliminary hearing "had not been
available at the first hearing, or at least had been 'unavailable as
set forth in State v. Brickey.'"

Quas at 4.

Unfortunately, Quas does not address the key legal issue in
dispute before the magistrate, before the trial court, and presented
on appeal:

Was the magistrate legally correct in adopting the

State's position that "new or previously unavailable evidence" means
evidence that was readily available to the State in previous
preliminary hearings (P.H.2 151-152)?

As the magistrate stated in

pondering the question,
I don't have any question that I've heard a
great deal of additional new evidence today, but
I suppose that the argument that's going to be
made, and I don't want to make your argument for
you, Miss Remal and Miss Johnson, is that this
was clearly available evidence at the time of the
original preliminary hearing. Isn't that really
the crux of the problem before the Court?
(P.H.2 138). See also opening brief of Appellant at 17-21
(discussing the legal meaning of "new or previously unavailable
evidence"); brief of Appellee at 14-16 (same); reply brief of
Appellant at 5-8 (same).

Quas accepts without scrutiny the magistrate's finding that
evidence at the second preliminary hearing was "new or previously
unavailable" on the basis that counsel for Mr. Quas failed to
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marshal the evidence.

Id. at 5.

Counsel for Mr. Quas did marshal the evidence.

After

extensive argument on the legal question of the meaning of "new or
previously unavailable evidence," counsel for Mr. Quas marshalled
the only evidence that met that standard—the testimony of Kristine
Knudson.

See opening brief of Appellant at 23-24, included in

Appendix 2 to this petition.

Counsel argued that the testimony of

Kristine Knudson was not adequate to reverse the magistrate's
previous dismissal of the information.

See id.

Counsel argued that

the reversal was actually improperly based on the presentation of
the pivotal gunshot residue evidence that was available and
requested by the magistrate at the first preliminary hearing and at
the continuance of the first preliminary hearing.2
22-24.

See id. at pages

Additionally, counsel for Mr. Quas addended a copy of the

prosecution's marshalling of the evidence contained in the State's
memorandum seeking to refile the case.

See id. at page 23 n.22;

opening brief of appellant, Appendix 2.
If the foregoing does not constitute "marshalling of the

2. This Court indicates in addition to the testimony of
Kristine Knudson concerning conversations with Mr. Quas after the
first preliminary hearing, the testimony of James Gaskill on the
gunshot residue (GSR) tests "most clearly met the Brickev standard"
because the tests were performed after the first preliminary
hearing, id. at 4.
The prosecutor admitted at the second preliminary hearing
that Mr. Gaskill could have done the tests before the first
preliminary hearing (P.H.2 at 137).
The State already had performed GSR tests through a
different expert at the first preliminary hearing but declined to
present the evidence when requested to do so by the magistrate
(T. 814 at 2-5).
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evidence," this Court should explain what is required in order to
obtain appellate review of issues requiring marshalling of the
evidence.

On rehearing, this Court should first address whether the
magistrate was correct in interpreting "new or previously
unavailable evidence" as meaning evidence that was reasonably
available at previous preliminary hearing(s).
In the event that this Court finds that the magistrate's
interpretation of the "new or previously unavailable evidence" was
legally incorrect, this Court should reassess whether the State
presented sufficient evidence meeting the Brickey standard to
justify the reversal of the magistrate's initial dismissal of the
information.

Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647-648.

II.
THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE PLAIN ERROR ANALYSIS.
Quas correctly states the plain error test:
First, the error must be "plain," that is, "it
should have been obvious to a trial court that it
was committing error." Eldredge, 773 P.2d at
35. Second, the error must affect the
substantial rights of the accused, that is, the
error must be harmful.
Quas at 5-6.
The application of the test in Quas needs clarification.
On page 7, the court states,
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Third, even if the remark were prejudicial, it
was not sufficiently obvious to invoke the plain
error exception, especially in light of the
corroborating evidence offered by this and other
witnesses,
(emphasis added).
This conclusion mixes the two prongs of the plain error
test.

The plainness prong is to be determined by looking at the

plainness of the legal impropriety of the ruling at issue in light
of the legal context prevailing when the error was made, not by
looking at other evidence supporting the verdict.

The harmfulness,

or prejudice prong is to be determined by looking at the impact of
the improper ruling in light of other evidence.

State v. Eldredge,

773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.9 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).
The portion of Quas discussing prejudice, quoted above,
needs additional clarification.

If this Court is satisfied with the

"corroborating evidence offered by this and other witnesses," then
Dr. Grey's testimony was not prejudicial.

But cf. Quas ("Even if

the remark were prejudicial . . . in light of the corroborating
evidence.").

The Quas opinion apparently concludes that the testimony of
Dr. Grey and Mr. Marchant concerning whether Mrs. Quas7 death fit
the behavioral norms of suicide victims was not plain error because
it was not sufficiently harmful, in light of other corroborating
evidence.

Id. at 7 and nn. 3 and 4.

Mr. Quas respectfully requests that this Court specify on
which corroborating evidence the Court relies in reaching this
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conclusion.

Particularly since this Court declined to publish its

analysis of numerous evidentiary questions raised in the trial court
and briefed on appeal, Quas at 7, it is essential for purposes of
further review of this Court's decision for this Court to show the
specific evidentiary basis of this Court's ruling on the plain error
question.

III.
THIS COURT SHOULD OMIT FOOTNOTE 5,
WHICH CONDITIONS THE APPEALABILITY OF ISSUES
ON THE CONTENT OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
AND DOCKETING STATEMENT.
In footnote 5, on pages 7 and 8, this Court indicates as
follows:
In his brief, appellant asks us to consider
issues surrounding the court's interlocutory
order to bind him over for trial. These issues
include whether the district court had
jurisdiction to review the circuit court's
decision to bind over, and whether his failure to
appeal the bindover was timely. We decline to
consider these issues because they were not
raised in appellant's docketing statement. Also,
the docketing statement and the notice of appeal
indicate that this is an appeal from a final
order of conviction. Finally, we have already
disposed of the jurisdictional issue in State v.
Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah App.), cert.
granted, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1990).
(emphasis added).
On rehearing, this Court should omit this footnote.

There

is neither precedent for nor logic in conditioning the appealability
of issues on the content of the docketing statement and notice of
appeal.
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The rules governing docketing statements and notices of
appeal have never before been interpreted as requiring parties to be
familiar with and specify all conceivable issues. Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9 (docketing statement), Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3 (notice of appeal).
Docketing statements are designed for purposes unrelated to
preservation of issues on appeal. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
9(b)("The docketing statement is not a brief and should not contain
arguments or procedural motions.

It is used by the appellate court

in assigning cases to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals
when both have jurisdiction, in making certifications to the Supreme
Court, in classifying cases for determining the priority to be
accorded them, in making summary dispositions when appropriate, and
in making calendar assignments.").

Notices of appeal are designed

for a purpose unrelated to the preservation of issues on appeal.
Nunlev v. Stan Katz Real Estate, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah
1964)("[T]he object of a notice of appeal is to advise the opposite
party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a
particular case.").
Given that appeals are frequently brought by appellate
counsel who did not participate in the trial, requiring appellate
counsel to be familiar with and specify all conceivable issues in
the notice of appeal and docketing statement sets forth an
impossible burden, especially since transcripts frequently are not
prepared before the notice of appeal and docketing statement must be
filed.

See, e.g., State v. Rodney W. Smith. Case No. 900214-CA;
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State v, Johnny Medina Duran, Case No. 900022-CA.

Conditioning the

appealability of issues on the content of the docketing statement
and notice of appeal would violate the Utah constitutional right to
appeal.

Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12; Article VIII

section 5.
Inasmuch as the issues that this Court declined to address
in footnote 5 were mooted by the Court's analysis of the merits of
the bindover issue, footnote 5 is unnecessary.

See Burkett v.

Schwendiman. 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)(mootness doctrine gives
appellate court discretion to abstain from deciding issues that will
not affect the rights of the parties).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Quas requests rehearing of this case.

DATED this

/?

day of July, 1991.
r\

^m i

r>

LISA JVREMAL

Attorney for Petitioner

CAN'DICE'A.
CANDICE A. J<6HNSON
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Attorney for Petitioner

E1IZJHBETH
Attorjney f
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State of Utah,

Q

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890601-CA

v.
John Quas,

F I L E D
(June 1 8 , 1991)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt take County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Lisa J. Remal, Candice A. Johnson, and Elizabeth
Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S. H. Atherton, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme.
GARFF, Judge:
Appellant, John Quas, appeals his conviction of second
degree murder, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(1990), a first degree felony.
FACTS
We recite the facts from the record i n the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d
1135, 1137 (Utah 1989). On the evening of June 15, 1987
appellant John Quas and his wife Susan Qua s were at home. Both
had been drinking. The two began to argue and to discuss
divorce. Sometime that evening appellant shot and killed Mrs.
Quas. At 9:41 p.m. appellant called the S alt Lake County 911
operator to report that his wife had shot herself. A police
officer and paramedics arrived within four minutes of
appellant's call. Mrs. Quas was found dea d, lying on some

sheets in the living room with a gunshot wound in her left
eye. Appellant said he had been in the shower, heard a
gunshot, and came out to find his wife lying on the floor.
On June 16, 1987, appellant was charged with second degree
murder. Those charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence
after a preliminary hearing in the third circuit court to
determine whether he should be bound over to stand trial. A
year later, on July 5, 1988, the information was refiled based
on new or previously unavailable evidence. A second
preliminary hearing was held before the same circuit court
judge. On October 24, 1988, the court found that refiling was
appropriate based on new or previously unavailable evidence and
that, coupled with the evidence presented at the former
hearing, the court had probable cause to bind appellant over to
stand trial as charged.
Appellant filed a motion in the district court to quash
the bindover order. The State moved to strike appellant's
motion to quash. The trial court granted the State's motion on
the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
sufficiency of evidence presented at the preliminary hearing.
Appellant petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for permission to
appeal from the district court's interlocutory order and the
court denied permission. Appellant was convicted of criminal
homicide, murder in the second degree. He appealed the
conviction to the Utah Supreme Court, which, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1990), transferred the appeal to
this court.
THE BRICKEY STANDARD
To consider the issues arising from the second preliminary
hearing, we first review the standard for refiling previously
dismissed criminal charges. This standard is found in State v.
Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986):
[D]ue process considerations prohibit a
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges
earlier dismissed for insufficient
evidence unless the prosecutor can show
that new or previously unavailable
evidence has surfaced or that other good
cause justifies refiling. . . . [W]hen a
charge is refiled, the prosecutor must,
whenever possible, refile the charges

before the same magistrate who does not
consider the matter de novo, but looks at
the facts to determine whether the new
evidence or changed circumstances are
sufficient to require a re-examination and
possible reversal of the earlier decision
dismissing the charges.
Id. at 647 (citations omitted). The Brickey court elucidated
the good cause exception, noting with approval that the court
in Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. App.
1971) held that "good cause to continue a preliminary hearing
for further investigation might exist when a prosecutor
innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to
obtain a bindover and further investigation clearly would not
be dilatory." 714 P.2d at 647-48, n.5 (citing Harper, 484 P.2d
at 897)- 1
To sum up the law of refiling as articulated in Brickey
and set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-7(d)(1) (1982),
refiling may take place in cases where new or previously
unavailable evidence has surfaced, or other good cause
justifies refiling. The good cause may include cases where a
prosecutor miscalculated the quantum of evidence needed to bind
over and the ensuing further investigation was not performed to
procrastinate, harass, or shop for a more favorable
magistrate. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. Finally, where
possible, the second hearing should not be de novo and should
1. Harper involved a continuance rather than a dismissal
followed by a refiling, which is the case here. Brickev does
not distinguish between a continuance of a preliminary hearing
and a refiling. And Brickev specifically mentions that a
finding of good cause can justify the refiling of dismissed
charges. 714 P.2d at 647. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-7(d)(1)
(198-2), as well as its replacement, Utah R. Crim. P. 7(8)(c),
each require the magistrate to dismiss the information if
probable cause is not established. In addition, both versions
explicitly provide for refiling under appropriate
circumstances: -The dismissal and discharge do not preclude
the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense." In any event, the Brickey requirements of
reviewing the evidence presented at the prior hearing and
appearing before the same magistrate, where possible, are
applicable whether the first hearing ended with a dismissal or
with a continuance.

be before the same magistrate, who is in the best position to
"determine whether the new evidence or changed circumstances
are sufficient to require a re-examination and possible
reversal of the earlier decision dismissing the charges.w Id.
NEW OR PREVIOUSLY UNAVAILABLE EVIDENCE
Appellant urges us to set aside the findings underlying
the circuit court's conclusion that the evidence presented at
the second preliminary hearing was new or previously
unavailable. Because the preliminary hearing was an action
tried upon the facts without a jury, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)
applies.
We will therefore not set aside the trial court's
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. To establish clear
error, the appellant "must marshal all of the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings of fact and then
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack." State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474,
475-76 (Utah 1990); State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah
1988) (findings made upon bench trial will be sustained unless
they are against the clear weight of the evidence). A finding
is clearly erroneous "when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.- State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948)).
At the second preliminary hearing, the State presented
twelve new exhibits and five new witnesess. Of this evidence,
the testimony of James Gaskill from the Weber State Crime Lab
and Kristine Knudson, appellant's former girlfriend, most
clearly met the Brickev standard because each testified about
tests or conversations occurring after the first preliminary
hearing. Gaskill testified about gunshot residue (GSR) tests
and Knudson testified to three conversations with appellant.
After the second preliminary hearing, the magistrate found that
the State had accumulated new evidence, and that such evidence
had not been available at the first hearing, or at least had
been "unavailable as set forth in State v. Brickev."
2. "The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern
criminal appeals to the appellate court, except as otherwise
provided." Utah R. Crim. P. 26{7).

In challenging this finding, appellant has not marshaled
the evidence in support of the pertinent findings, nor has he
demonstrated that the marshaled evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to
support them. We therefore accept the court's finding that
evidence presented at the second preliminary hearing was new or
unavailable.
We next consider the issue of whether the Brickev standard
was met. Given the court's findings, this issue presents a
conclusion of law to which we accord no deference and which we
review for correctness. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 497
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted, 804 P.2d 1232 (1990).
Because the court correctly found that the evidence
presented was new or%unavailable, and because the second
preliminary hearing was in the same forum and before the same
magistrate as was the first preliminary hearing, and because
the magistrate considered the record of the prior hearing along
with the evidence presented at the second hearing, we see no
error in the court's conclusion that the Brickev standard was
met and that refiling was appropriate.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Having found that the bindover was proper, we now consider
the other issues pertaining to the trial. Appellant argues
that the testimony of Dr. Todd Grey, the medical examiner, and
that of Brent Marchant of the State Medical Examiner's Office,
to the effect that the nature of the victim's wounds was more
consistent with homicide than with suicide, violated Utah R.
Evid. 403, 404 and 702.
Because no contemporaneous objections to this testimony
were made, appellant has waived his right to raise the matter
on appeal, State v, Eldredoe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert.
denied,
U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989), unless the
testimony comes within the plain error analysis. I£.; State v.
Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah App. 1990).
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) provides w[n]othing in this rule
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the
court." The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting this rule, has
established a two-part test to determine plain error. First,
the error must be "plain," that is, "it should have been

obvious to a trial court that it%was committing error."
Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35. Second, the error must affect the
substantial rights of the accused, that is, the error must be
harmful. 1&. The policy behind the plain error test is to
allow the court to reach justice in a given case. 1£. at 35
n.8; Braun, 787 P.2d at 1342. See Utah R. Evid. 102.
The transcript reveals that Dr. Grey did not give
psychological profile testimony, condemned in State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1989), nor did he vouch for
the truthfulness of a witness's testimony based on anecdotal
-statistical- evidence, condemned in State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d
498, 501 (Utah 1986) and also in State v. Ioro, 801 P.2d 938,
941 (Utah App. 1990).
Instead, Dr. Grey^addressed the issue of whether the
victim died via suicide or homicide by examining the physical
evidence of the victim's body and by demonstrating the
hypothesis of suicide using a live model whose arm length was
identical to that of the victim. He had the model hold the gun
in various positions to see whether it was possible for Mrs.
Quas to shoot herself with the muzzle sixteen to eighteen
inches away from the entry wound and with the gun oriented so
that the bullet path would correspond to that of the victim.
He had the model hold the gun with either hand, with both
hands, and in a position so she could fire using her thumb. He
also had the model hold the gun in these various positions with
her arms extended as far as possible. He found that the gun
could be held in the right hand at fourteen or fifteen inches
away, in the left hand at fourteen inches away, or in both
hands at twelve and a half or thirteen inches away. He
concluded that, while it may have been technically possible for
Mrs. Quas to shoot herself,
it's a very cumbersome and in my
experience completely atypical way for
somebody to commit suicide. When people
shoot themselves, they usually put the gun
where they want the bullet to go and pull
the trigger. I've never seen a clearly
proven suicide where the person has held
the gun as far as away from their body as
they possibly can before shooting.
Here, the gist of the testimony goes to the fact that, if
the victim had committed suicide, she chose a physically
awkward and hence unlikely method to carry out the deed.

Both Rammel and Ioro condemn the use of evidence
"concerning matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis
such as witness veracity,H because such evidence leads to undue
prejudice. Iorg, 801 P.2d at 941-42. However, Rammel and Ioro
do not apply in this case. First, Dr. Grey's testimony was not
offered as statistical evidence that Mrs. Quas did not commit
suicide. Rather, the testimony was offered to prove that,
while it was technically possible to achieve suicide given the
circumstances, it would have been "cumbersome" and "atypical."
Second, Dr. Grey was not vouching for another witness's
veracity, nor was he giving statistical probabilities for
another's veracity. Third, even if the remark were
prejudicial, it was not sufficiently obvious to invoke the
plain error exception, especially in light of the corroborating
evidence offered by this and other witnesses.^
Brent Marchant, 3n investigator with the State Medical
Examiner's Office, did not opine as to whether the death was a
homicide or suicide. Neither did he testify as to the profile
of the hypothetical suicide victim. He testified that Mrs.
Quas's wound was unusual because, from his ten years'
experience investigating many of the one hundred and fifty
gunshot suicides that occur in Utah each year, he had seen only
one suicide gunshot wound inflicted in the eye. That wound was
a direct contact wound, unlike that of the victim. Therefore,
even if Marchant's statement were erroneous, it is not
sufficiently obvious to invoke the plain error exception.4
As to the other issues appellant raises on appeal, we have
reviewed them and find them to be without merit. See State v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989). 5
3. While the requirement of obviousness may be waived in cases
of "a high degree of harmfulness," we do not find such a degree
of harmfulness in this case in light of the corroborating
evidence. Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35 n.8; Braun, 787 P.2d at 1342.
4.

See note 3.

5. In his brief, appellant asks us to consider issues
surrounding the court's interlocutory order to bind him over
for trial. These issues include whether the district court had
jurisdiction to review the circuit court's decision to bind
over, and whether his failure to appeal the bindover was
timely. We decline to consider these issues because they were
not raised in appellant's docketing statement. Also, the

CONCLUSION
We find no error in the court's conclusions that evidence
presented in the second preliminary hearing included new or
previously unavailable evidence, that the refiling met the
Brickey standard, and finally, that the experts' conclusion
that thegxidence supported a homicide rather than a suicide
did ne^constitute plain ej=?or. We therefore affirm.

*&^^^'^2~

5«-grTaT^W. Garff, Judge,

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Iregor^ffl Orme, Judge

(Footnote 5 continued)
docketing statement and the notice of appeal indicate that this
is an appeal from a final order of conviction. Finally, we
have already disposed of the jurisdictional issue in State v.
Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 150
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1990).

APPENDIX 2

C. THE MAGISTRATE IN THIS CASE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING THE BINDOVER ORDER ON THE BASIS OF
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE SECOND PRELIMINARY HEARING THAT WAS
READILY AVAILABLE TO THE PROSECUTION AT THE FIRST PRELIMINARY
HEARING•
In the instant case, the magistrate indicated prior to
the second preliminary hearing that she would bind the case over
if Mr. Matheson would present the gunshot residue test foundation
and results that Mr. McConkie had previously refused to present
upon the magistrate's request at the first preliminary hearing
(T.814 2-5, 7 ) . Given this assurance, the State proceeded to
present evidence additional to the pivotal gunshot residue tests
(which were available at the first preliminary hearing), not to
secure a bindover order, but to insure that Appellant's
conviction could withstand appellate review (T.814 6-7). See
Appendix 1.
It is doubtful that the Brickey court set forth the
Utah due process standard for refiling dismissed cases with an
eye to improving the appearance of appellate records.

Rather, it

seems that the court set forth the standard for refiling cases
to force prosecutors to present their cases forthrightly the
21
first time at preliminary hearing.
dismissal).
In Utah also, a prosecutor faced with an improper
dismissal for lack of probable cause can appeal the ruling. Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(3)(a). See also R. 17, where the
State concedes that extraordinary writs provide the State with
relief from an improper dismissal.
21
See Brickey at 714 P.2d at 647 (indicating that
"fundamental fairness" requires judicial restraint of prosecutors
in this context, because the good faith of prosecutors is "a

22

Given the misapplication of the Brickey standard in
this case, perhaps this Court should refrain from engaging in
Brickey analysis altogether.

Nonetheless, Appellant provides

that analysis infra.
Inasmuch as the magistrate adopted a due process
standard that permitted refiling of the information because the
prosecution presented evidence in addition to that presented at
the first preliminary hearing (P.H.2 152) # the magistrate did not
make findings indicating whether the State had presented any
evidence during the second preliminary hearing that was not
22
reasonably available at the first preliminary hearing.
Appellant maintains his position that the only evidence
presented by the State during the second preliminary hearing that
might have met the Brickey due process standard was the testimony
of Kristine Knudson, who testified that after the first
preliminary hearing, Appellant made statements to her concerning
23
the night of Susan's death (P.H.2 73-84).
While the magistrate
fragile protection for the accused.").
22
A summary of the evidence presented at the first and
second preliminary hearings was filed by the prosecution, and can
be found at R. 18-30 and in Appendix 2 to this brief. While the
summary is not completely accurate, it is adequate to give this
Court a purview of the evidence presented at the preliminary
hearings, and to show that, with the exception of the testimony
of Kristine Knudson, all of the evidence presented at the second
hearing was reasonably available at the first hearing.
23
Ms. Knudson indicated, "He said he couldn't tell where
she had gotten shot, and he said that he picked up her head and
that there was blood coming out the back of her head. Then he
said that he put a sheet under her." (P.H.2 75-76). She
indicated that Appellant also told her that when he heard the
shot and left the shower, he could tell Susan was already dead,
23

did indicate that the statements referred to by Ms. Knudson
during the second preliminary hearing were "clearly inconsistent"
with Appellant's statements to the investigating officers (P.H.2
140), the magistrate did not indicate that this previously
unavailable evidence was the reason for the bindover order in the
second case.
Because the magistrate at the first preliminary hearing
indicated her disbelief of Appellant's statements to the
investigating officers (P.H.I 169), it can hardly be assumed that
this previously unavailable evidence from Ms. Knudson resulted in
the bindover order.

Rather, the bindover order was a result of

the presentation of the previously available evidence presented
at the second hearing, the gunshot residue tests.
But as explained by the Brickey court, it was the
State's burden to demonstrate with previously unavailable
24
evidence that the initial dismissal should not stand.
Without meeting the Brickey standard (neither for
purposes of appellate review, nor for purposes of fulfilling the
and went downstairs to check the wash prior to calling for help
(P.H.2 77).
24

The Brickey court explained,
The Jones court further held that when a
charge is refiled, the prosecutor must,
whenever possible, refile the charges before
the same magistrate who does not consider
that matter de novo, but looks at the facts
to determine whether the new evidence or
changed circumstances are sufficient to
require a re-examination and possible
reversal of the earlier decision dismissing
the charges. I<i. at 171-72.
714 P.2d at 647.
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